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I want to discuss a rather delicate matter concerning a notoriously difficult subject,
the foundations of quantum mechanics, a subject that has inspired a great many peculiar
proclamations. Some examples:
. . . the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively
in the same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we
observe them . . . is impossible . . . [1]
and
We can no longer speak of the behavior of the particle independently of the
process of observation. As a final consequence, the natural laws formulated
mathematically in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary parti-
cles themselves but with our knowledge of them. Nor is it any longer possible
to ask whether or not these particles exist in space and time objectively . . .
. . . Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees
itself as an actor in this interplay between man and nature. The scientific
method of analysing, explaining, and classifying has become conscious of its
limitations . . . method and object can no longer be separated. [2]
and
A complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse
points of view which defy a unique description. Indeed, strictly speaking,
the conscious analysis of any concept stands in a relation of exclusion to its
immediate application. [3]
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This last quotation is an expression of what has traditionally been called complement-
arity—but what might nowadays be called multiphysicalism.
For my purposes here, what is most relevant about these sentiments is that they
were expressed, not by lay popularizers of modern science, nor by its postmodern critics,
but by Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr, the two physicists most responsible, with the
possible exception of Erwin Schro¨dinger, for the creation of quantum theory. It does not
require great imagination to suggest that there is little in these sentiments with which a
postmodernist would be inclined to disagree and much that he or she would be happy to
regard as compelling support for the postmodern enterprise (see, for example, [4, 5, 6]).
The “quantum philosophy” expressed by such statements is part of the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory, which, in addition to the vagueness and subjectivity
suggested by the preceding quotes, also incorporated as a central ingredient the notion that
in the microscopic quantum domain the laws of nature involve irreducible randomness.
The Copenhagen interpretation was widely, I would say at one time almost universally,
accepted within the physics community, though there were some notable exceptions, such
as Einstein and Schro¨dinger. Here is Schro¨dinger in 1926 [7, page 228]:
Bohr’s . . . approach to atomic problems . . . is really remarkable. He is
completely convinced that any understanding in the usual sense of the word
is impossible. Therefore the conversation is almost immediately driven into
philosophical questions, and soon you no longer know whether you really take
the position he is attacking, or whether you really must attack the position he
is defending.
and Schro¨dinger in 1959 [8, page 472]:
With very few exceptions (such as Einstein and Laue) all the rest of the
theoretical physicists were unadulterated asses and I was the only sane person
left. . . . The one great dilemma that ails us . . . day and night is the wave-
particle dilemma. In the last decade I have written quite a lot about it and
have almost tired of doing so: just in my case the effect is null . . . because most
of my friendly (truly friendly) nearer colleagues (. . . theoretical physicists) . . .
have formed the opinion that I am—naturally enough—in love with ‘my’ great
success in life (viz., wave mechanics) reaped at the time I still had all my wits
at my command and therefore, so they say, I insist upon the view that ‘all
is waves’. Old-age dotage closes my eyes towards the marvelous discovery
of ‘complementarity’. So unable is the good average theoretical physicist to
believe that any sound person could refuse to accept the Kopenhagen oracle. . .
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Einstein in 1949 [9] offered a somewhat more constructive response:
I am, in fact, rather firmly convinced that the essentially statistical char-
acter of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to the fact that
this (theory) operates with an incomplete description of physical systems . . .
[In] a complete physical description, the statistical quantum theory would
. . . take an approximately analogous position to the statistical mechanics
within the framework of classical mechanics . . .
Part of what Einstein is saying here is that (much of) the apparent peculiarity of quantum
theory, and in particular its randomness, arises from mistaking an incomplete description
for a complete one.
In view of the radical character of quantum philosophy, the arguments offered in
support of it have been surprisingly weak. More remarkable still is the fact that it is
not at all unusual, when it comes to quantum philosophy, to find the very best physicists
and mathematicians making sharp emphatic claims, almost of a mathematical character,
that are trivially false and profoundly ignorant. For example, John von Neumann, one of
the greatest mathematicians of this century, claimed to have mathematically proven that
Einstein’s dream, of a deterministic completion or reinterpretation of quantum theory,
was mathematically impossible. He concluded that [10]
It is therefore not, as is often assumed, a question of a re-interpretation of
quantum mechanics—the present system of quantum mechanics would have
to be objectively false, in order that another description of the elementary
processes than the statistical one be possible.
This claim of von Neumann was, of course, just about universally accepted. For
example, Max Born, who formulated the statistical interpretation of the wave function,
assures us that [11]
No concealed parameters can be introduced with the help of which the in-
deterministic description could be transformed into a deterministic one. Hence
if a future theory should be deterministic, it cannot be a modification of the
present one but must be essentially different. (Born 1949)
However, in 1952 David Bohm, through a refinement of de Broglie’s pilot wave model
of 1927, found just such a reformulation of quantum theory[12]. Bohm’s theory, Bohmian
mechanics, was precise, objective, and deterministic—not at all congenial to quantum
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philosophy and a counterexample to the claims of von Neumann. Nonetheless, we still find,
more than a quarter of a century after the discovery of Bohmian mechanics, statements
such as these:
The proof he [von Neumann] published . . . , though it was made much more
convincing later on by Kochen and Specker, still uses assumptions which, in
my opinion, can quite reasonably be questioned. . . . In my opinion, the most
convincing argument against the theory of hidden variables was presented by
J. S. Bell (1964). (Eugene Wigner 1976 [13])
and
This [hidden variables] is an interesting idea and even though few of us
were ready to accept it, it must be admitted that the truly telling argument
against it was produced as late as 1965, by J. S. Bell. . . . This appears to
give a convincing argument against the hidden variables theory. (Wigner 1983
[14])
Now there are many more statements of a similar character that I could have cited;
I chose these partly because Wigner was not only one of the leading physicists of his
generation, but, unlike most of his contemporaries, he was also profoundly concerned
with the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics and wrote on the subject with
great clarity and insight.
There was, however, one physicist who wrote on this subject with even greater clarity
and insight than Wigner himself, namely the very J. S. Bell whom Wigner praises for
demonstrating the impossibility of a deterministic completion of quantum theory such as
Bohmian mechanics. So let’s see how Bell himself reacted to Bohm’s discovery:
But in 1952 I saw the impossible done. It was in papers by David Bohm.
Bohm showed explicitly how parameters could indeed be introduced, into non-
relativistic wave mechanics, with the help of which the indeterministic descrip-
tion could be transformed into a deterministic one. More importantly, in my
opinion, the subjectivity of the orthodox version, the necessary reference to
the ‘observer,’ could be eliminated. [15, page 160]
and Bell again
Bohm’s 1952 papers on quantum mechanics were for me a revelation. The
elimination of indeterminism was very striking. But more important, it seemed
to me, was the elimination of any need for a vague division of the world into
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“system” on the one hand, and “apparatus” or “observer” on the other. I have
always felt since that people who have not grasped the ideas of those papers
. . . and unfortunately they remain the majority . . . are handicapped in any
discussion of the meaning of quantum mechanics. [15, page 173]
Wigner to the contrary notwithstanding, Bell did not establish the impossibility of a
deterministic reformulation of quantum theory, nor did he ever claim to have done so. On
the contrary, over the course of the past several decades, until his untimely death several
years ago, Bell was the prime proponent, for a good part of this period almost the sole
proponent, of the very theory, Bohmian mechanics, that he is supposed to have demol-
ished. What Bell did demonstrate is the remarkable conclusion that nature, if governed by
the predictions of quantum theory, must be nonlocal, exhibiting surprising connections
between distant events. And unlike the claims of quantum philosophy, this nonlocal-
ity is well founded, and, with the experiments of Aspect [16], rather firmly established.
Nonetheless, it is far from universally accepted by the physics community. Here is Bell,
expressing his frustration at the obtuseness of his critics, and insisting that his argument
for nonlocality involves no unwarranted assumptions:
Despite my insistence that the determinism was inferred rather than assumed,
you might still suspect somehow that it is a preoccupation with determinism
that creates the problem. Note well then that the following argument makes
no mention whatever of determinism. ... Finally you might suspect that the
very notion of particle, and particle orbit . . . has somehow led us astray. . . .
So the following argument will not mention particles . . . nor any other picture
of what goes on at the microscopic level. Nor will it involve any use of the
words ‘quantum mechanical system’, which can have an unfortunate effect on
the discussion. The difficulty is not created by any such picture or any such
terminology. It is created by the predictions about the correlations in the
visible outputs of certain conceivable experimental set-ups. [15, page 150]
So what is the relevance of what I’ve described to the theme of this conference? Well,
there’s some bad news and some good news. The bad news, nothing you didn’t already
know anyway, is that objectivity is difficult to maintain and that physicists, even in
their capacity as scientists, are only human. Nothing new. I must say, however, that
the complaceny of the physics establishment with regard to the foundations of quantum
mechanics has been, it seems to me, somewhat astonishing, though I must admit to lacking
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sufficient historical perspective to have genuine confidence that what has occurred is at
all out of the ordinary. But let me once again quote Bell:
But why then had Born not told me of this ‘pilot wave’? If only to point
out what was wrong with it? Why did von Neumann not consider it? . . .
Why is the pilot wave picture ignored in text books? Should it not be taught,
not as the only way, but as an antidote to the prevailing complacency? To
show us that vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism, are not forced on us
by experimental facts, but by deliberate theoretical choice? [15, page 160]
The last quoted sentence refers, of course, to the good news: that when we consider,
not the behavior of physicists but the physics itself, we find, in the stark contrast between
the claims of quantum philosophy and the actual facts of quantum physics, compelling
support for the objectivity and rationality of nature herself.
Here is one more bit of information somewhat relevant in this regard. You may well
be wondering how, in fact, Bohm managed to accomplish what was so widely regarded
as impossible, and what his completion of quantum theory involves. But you probably
imagine that what eluded so many great minds could not be conveyed in but a few minutes,
even were this an audience of experts. However, the situation is quite otherwise. In
order to arrive at Bohmian mechanics from standard quantum theory one need do almost
nothing! One need only avoid quantum philosophy and complete the usual quantum
description in what is really the most obvious way: by simply including the positions of
the particles of a quantum system as part of the state description of that system, allowing
these positions to evolve in the most natural way[17]. The entire quantum formalism,
including the uncertainty principle and quantum randomness, emerges from an analysis
of this evolution (see [17, 18]). My long-time collaborator, Detlef Du¨rr[19], has expressed
this succinctly—though in fact not succinctly enough—by declaring that the essential
innovation of Bohmian mechanics is the insight that particles move! Bell, referring to the
double-slit interference experiment, put the matter this way:
Is it not clear from the smallness of the scintillation on the screen that we have
to do with a particle? And is it not clear, from the diffraction and interference
patterns, that the motion of the particle is directed by a wave? De Broglie
showed in detail how the motion of a particle, passing through just one of two
holes in screen, could be influenced by waves propagating through both holes.
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And so influenced that the particle does not go where the waves cancel out,
but is attracted to where they cooperate. This idea seems to me so natural
and simple, to resolve the wave-particle dilemma in such a clear and ordinary
way, that it is a great mystery to me that it was so generally ignored. [15,
page 191]
I think this should be a bit of a mystery for all of us!
I am grateful to Rebecca Goldstein and Eugene Speer for their comments and sugges-
tions. This work was supported in part by NSF Grants DMS–9305930 and DMS–9504556.
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